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Charter Eviction: Litigating Out of House and Home
MARGOT YOUNG*
La décision Tanudjaja c Procureur général (Canada) aborde, de façon nouvelle et
complexe, la question des droits relatifs au logement en vertu de la Charte canadienne
des droits et libertés. L’action et l’inaction gouvernementale que l’on caractérise de
violations constitutionnelles et les vastes demandes de recours qui s’y retrouvent,
reflètent l’aspect « pixellisé » des préoccupations actuelles relatives au logement, un
aspect essentiel à la compréhension de la crise de sécurité du logement au Canada. En
rejetant la contestation à un stade préliminaire, les cours supérieure et d’appel de
l’Ontario risquent de rejeter la Charte comme instrument pouvant jouer un rôle
relativement aux préoccupations profondes de notre pays en matière de justice sociale.
Plus particulièrement, l’invocation judiciaire, sous forme de formule stricte, de
préoccupations relatives aux droits positifs et à la justiciabilité, laisse les plus
vulnérables d’entre nous sans aucun recours constitutionnel, et ce, plus particulièrement
lorsque des questions de justice complexes sont en jeu.
The case of Tanudjaja v Attorney General (Canada) takes up the cause of housing rights
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in a novel and complex way. The
government actions and inactions cited as constitutional breaches and the broad remedial
requests reflect the “pixelated” picture of housing concerns necessary to understanding
Canada’s housing security crisis. In dismissing the challenge at a preliminary stage, the
Ontario Superior and Appeal Courts risk rendering the Charter irrelevant to the deep
social justice concerns that cross our country. More specifically, formulaic judicial
invocation of concerns about positive rights and justiciability leave the most vulnerable
among us constitutionally outside in the cold, particularly when the issues of justice at
stake are complex.

THE RECENT STRUGGLE TO ACCESS constitutional justice in the Ontario case of Tanudjaja v
Attorney General (Canada)1 marks well the current unsettled state of Canadian constitutional
protection for those without adequate housing. The case, along with its novel remedial request,
also illustrates the faceted character of housing as a social justice concern. Indeed, the complex
nature of housing rights underscores the importance of this case and the applicants’ specific and
layered remedial request. Yet, before any substantive consideration could be given to the issues
raised, the case has foundered: the challenge vacated at the urging of the governments2 by a trial
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1

Tanudjaja v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 5410, 116 OR (3d) 574 Lederer J [Tanudjaja].
See, for example, the Notice of Motion by the Attorney-General of Canada (11 June 2012), online:
<http://www.acto.ca/assets/files/cases/Notice%20of%20Motion%20to%20Strike%20-%20R2H.pdf>.
2
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court and an appeal court,3 each overly bound to restrictive constitutional narratives. While
application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada pends, the issues catalyzing the
challenge thicken and worsen.4
The task this comment takes up is to critique the “eviction” to date of this case from the
realm of justiciable constitutional claims. It is my argument that, unless socio-economic rights
cases are allowed to proceed on the bases on which this case rests, we will largely confirm the
irrelevance of constitutional protection for the most vulnerable in our society. The challenge’s
target of a wide range of government action and inaction, and the call for a constitutionally
imposed obligation to develop appropriately complex and nuanced ways to respond to the
housing crisis, may best lend effective and coherent force to the rights at issue. The casting out
of the Tanudjaja challenge on preliminary grounds related to remedy and cause of action
threatens to expand significantly the uselessness of the Charter as a means of addressing some of
the most pressing and pervasive social justice concerns of our time. The evidence the applicants
bring will be left unconsidered and the governments will face no constitutional pressure to
respond to a human rights calamity. Thus, my argument in this paper is specific to the kind of
preliminary challenge Tanudjaja faces. Without recognition of the legitimacy of challenges of
this sort, the key issues raised by housing rights will have no home within Charter justice. Early
criticisms of the Charter as a document stuck in nineteenth century liberalism, blind to material
inequality, and thus with no promise of meaningful rights for the economically marginalized,
will be confirmed.5

I. HOUSING IN CANADA
To state the obvious, “[t]he provision of affordable housing is a basic pillar of a civilized
society.”6 Among basic needs, housing is clearly front and centre. The case for housing as a key
determinant of health, life chances, social inclusion, and well-being has been fully and
convincingly made.7 From the South African post-Apartheid context, Judge Albie Sachs, when
3

Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852 [Tanudjaja, ONCA]. The appeal was argued May 26–
27, 2014 at the Ontario Court of Appeal.
4
For example, the latest homelessness count in Vancouver shows an increase in unsheltered homelessness in 2014
from 2011. 2014 Metro Vancouver Homeless Count Preliminary Report, online: Stop Homelessness
<http://stophomelessness.ca/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/Preliminary_release_report_final_April_23_14
_to_be_posted.pdf>. See infra, text at note 5.
5
For an illustration of progressive critiques of constitutionally enshrined rights, see: Joel Bakan, Just Words:
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Joel Bakan, “Constitutional
Interpretation and Social Change: You Can't Always Get What You Want (Nor What You Need)” (1991) 70:2 Can
L Rev 307; Alan C Hutchinson & Andrew Petter, “Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter”
(1988) 38:2 UTLJ 278; Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Liberal Promise of Constitutional Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press , 2010).
6
William Strange, “The Unintended Consequences of Housing Policy” (2003), online: CD Howe Institute
Backgrounder <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/backgrounder_75.pdf>.
7
The literature making these points is vast. See, for example, this selection of recent reports: Lorna Fox O’Mahony,
“The Meaning of Home: From Theory to Practice” (2009) 5:2 IJLBE 156 at 157; Margaret Haworth-Brockman &
Lissa Donner, “Housing and Health: A Sex and Gender-based Analysis from Manitoba” in Barbara Clow et al, eds,
Rising to the Challenge: Sex and Gender-Based Analysis for Health Planning, Policy and Research in Canada
(Atlantic Centre of Excellence for Women’s Health, 2009) 110; Michael Shapcott, “Housing in Canada” (2010),
online: Wellesley Institute <http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/publications/new-report-precarious-housing-incanada-2010/> [Shapcott, Precarious]; Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in
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on that county’s Constitutional Court, wrote that those without minimally adequate housing live
lives “spent in systematized insecurity on the fringes of organized society.”8 The Indian Supreme
Court links access to housing with full human personhood.9 And, in Canada, too, it is
acknowledged that it is difficult to do well on any measure of human flourishing without access
to housing. The British Columbia Court of Appeal in Victoria (City) v Adams referred to the
need for shelter for the homeless as involving “the needs of some of the most vulnerable
members of our society for one of the most basic of human needs, shelter.”10 A fixed address is a
practical necessity for the realization of citizenship rights.11 The persistence of housing
insecurity in the face of such indisputable argument is shameful.
Distinctions between shelter and a “home” are also important pieces of the conversation
about housing provision and inadequacy. There is considerable literature on this too.12 Such an
observation signals why adequate housing matters so much and why mere shelter provision is not
enough. As Fox O’Mahony states, it is the relationship between the person and her or his home,
that “marks ‘home’ out as different from other types of property.”13 The “social, psychological
and cultural factors which a physical structure acquires through use as a home” stand out.14
Adequate policy discussion of this issue will note “the intangible and uncommodifiable aspects
of housing, most importantly the concept of home.”15 Housing policy that meets our human
rights commitments must take this into account.

II. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING
International human rights treaties recognize access to adequate housing as a fundamental human
right, prioritizing recognition of housing as a basic requirement of personhood. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists housing as a feature of the entitlement to a standard
of living adequate for health and well-being.16 Similarly, Article 11 of the United Nations

Canada: 2014 (Toronto: The Homeless Hub Press, 2014) [Gaetz et al, Homelessness]; Stephen Gaetz, The Real Cost
of Homelessness: Can we save money by doing the right thing? (Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research
Network Press, 2012).
8
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and others (CCT 22/08) [2009] ZACC 16
(10 June 2009), Sachs J at para 177, as cited in Jessie Hohmann, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities
(Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2013) at 96.
9
Hohmann, supra note 8 at 176. Hohmann references for example, Chameli Singh and other state of Uttar Pradesh
and others (1996) 2 SCC 549 (Supreme Court of India).
10
Victoria (City) v Adams, 2009 BCCA 563, 313 DLR (4th) 29 [Adams].
11
Hohmann, supra note 8 at 174.
12
See, for example, Hohmann, supra note 8 at 169-177; Lorna Fox, “The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept
Or A Legal Challenge?” (2002) 29 JL & Soc’y 580; Jerome Tognolic, “Residential Environments” in Daniel Stokols
& Irwin Altman, eds, Handbook of Environmental Psychology (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1987).
13
Fox O’Mahony, supra note 7 at 157.
14
Fox, supra note 12 at 590.
15
Hohmann, supra note 8 at 169.
16
This idea has been under development since the latter part of the twentieth century following the World Habitat
conferences in Vancouver (1976) and Istanbul (1996). These two international gatherings demonstrated international
political recognition that housing is a human right.
The full text of this section of the Universal Declaration reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is understood to guarantee
adequate housing.17 Women’s equal right to housing is also protected in Article 14(h) of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.18
Considerable guidance is available from international and national commentary on what
adequate housing entails. General Comment No. 4 from the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights develops what is meant by “adequate” housing. In particular, seven features fill
out the concept of adequacy: security of tenure for all forms of housing occupation; provision of
basic services, materials and infrastructure; affordability as reflected in percentage of average
income level; habitability such that housing provides protection and enough space; accessibility
for those with barriers to access; location that is safe, and proximate; and, cultural adequacy
reflecting cultural identities.19 This list is useful to thinking about the requirements of adequacy,
indeed, it is necessary to taking seriously the subtleties of the shelter/home connection. But, the
United Nations catalogue is a starting place only. As Westendorp points out, these criteria are
phrased in a gender-neutral manner. Each, she argues, needs to be more nuanced to take account
of the situations women face in procuring adequate housing. For example, Westendorp would
expand the list, adding to it the aspects of safety and dignity at home, reflecting concerns about
the widespread domestic abuse experienced by women.20
The current housing situation in Canada is information that is neither new nor generally
unknown. The argument that there is a made-in-Canada housing emergency has been repeatedly
articulated by both domestic and international actors. Report after report documents from a
domestic Canadian perspective the range and degree of housing inadequacy that faces too large a
number of those resident in Canada.21 For example, a 2010 report from the Wellesley Institute
states that: “Deep and persistent housing insecurity and homelessness are truly nationwide

the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, UN Doc
A/810 (10 December 1948) 71 at Article 25.
17
Article 11(1) states: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this
right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.” United
Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200A
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27, online:
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx> [CESCR].
18
UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18
December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249. It is worth noting that this convention protects women’s
equality rights in the area of housing. It does not establish a free standing right to housing specific to women.
19
CESCR General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, General Comment 4, The right to adequate housing (Sixth session, 1991), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at
114 (1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 18 (2003).
20
Ingrid Westendorp, “What is the Matter with the International Norm?” in Kam-Wah Chan & Patricia Kennett,
eds, Women and Housing: An International Analysis (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) at 11.
21
See for example, CEDAW, Concluding observations, 7 November 2008, CEDAW/C/CAN/CO/7;
ICCPR Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations 20 April 2006, CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5; CESCR,
Concluding observations, 22 May 2006, E/C.12/CAN/CO/4 - E/C.12/CAN/CO/5; Michael Shapcott, “Homes For
All: Social Housing In Toronto And Canada” (2014), online: Wellesley Institute
<http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/housing/homes-for-all-social-housing-in-toronto-and-canada/>.
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issues—from Iqaluit in the north to St. John’s in the east to Victoria in the west.”22 At the
international level, experts have weighed in. The recent report by the then United Nations
Special Rapporteur for Adequate Housing referred to a “crisis of homelessness and inadequate
housing” in Canada.23 In a country as wealthy, and with such a high general standard of living as
Canada, one is rightly appalled that our governments allow this degree of homelessness and
housing insecurity to continue. We should feel a principled impatience for change.
Canada has no national, fixed definition of homelessness. The Canadian Mortgage and
Housing Corporation (CMHC), Canada’s national housing agency, defines housing affordability
as spending less than 30 percent of before-tax household income on housing costs.24 This
definition thus identifies households in “Core Housing Need” as households where more than 30
per cent of pre-tax income is spent on shelter costs.25 In 2010 the incidence of Core Housing
Need was 13.2 per cent for urban households, up from 12.3 per cent in 2007.26 Over the six year
period from 2005 – 2010, 17.5 per cent of urban individuals spent at least one year in Core
Housing Need (one quarter of whom were in Core Housing Need for four out of those six
years.)27 Lone-parent households and one-person senior female households are the household
types with the highest Core Housing Need. For these and other low income households, the
private rental housing market typically requires considerably more than 30 per cent of income.
There are too few private and public rental units that are affordable and adequate. The “dominos
fall” such that those with the fewest resources scramble for a shrinking supply of affordable,
cheap housing.28
Individuals respond to housing insecurity in a range of ways. Many households react to
the high and unreachable cost of housing by consuming bad housing.29 Women, in particular,
may be unable to leave abusive domestic situations.30 Younger women will trade sex for
shelter.31 Families live in spaces that are too small, with mould or infestations. Households in
22

Shapcott, Precarious, supra note 7.
Miloon Kothari, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Addendum,
Mission to Canada, 9 to 22 October 2007, A/HRC/10/7/Add.3 17 February 2009 at para 32.
24
For more information about the CMHC, see online: CMHC <https://www03.cmhcschl.gc.ca/catalog/productList.cfm?cat=123&lang=en&fr=1407434152545>.
25
This definition itself is subject to some critical discussion. The significance, or impact, of 30 per cent of
household income spent on housing costs will vary given overall household income and specific needs certain
households may have. For example, very high household incomes can accommodate proportionally high housing
costs in ways low or medium incomes cannot. And, very low income households with other sorts of special needs
expenses may find an output of, say, 20 per cent of household income on housing to be unaffordable.
26
CMHC, “Executive Summary”, Canadian Housing Observer 2013 at 1-10, online: CMHC <https://www03.cmhcschl.gc.ca/catalog/productDetail.cfm?cat=122&itm=25&lang=en&fr=1407464767702>
[Canadian
Housing
Observer 2013].
27
Canadian Housing Observer 2013, supra note 26 at 6–4.
28
Penny Gurstein & Margot Young, “Just Housing Provision: Contested Urban Space and Resource Distribution.”
Draft paper on file with author.
29
Strange, supra note 6 at 1.
30
For a discussion of this in relation to residential tenancy law, see West Coast Legal Education and Action Fund,
Briefing Note: Amending the Residential Tenancy Act to Protect Victims of Domestic Violence, online: LEAF
<http://www.westcoastleaf.org/userfiles/file/Amending%20the%20RTA%20to%20Protect%20Victims%20of%20Vi
olence%20-%20Briefing%20Note%20(Apr%202014).pdf>.
31
Shyanne Reid, Helene Berman & Cheryl Forchuk, “Living on the Streets in Canada: A Feminist Narrative Study
of Girls and Young Women” (2005) 28:4 Issues in Comprehensive Pediatric Nursing 237.
23
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core housing need are likely to compromise full and dignified involvement in Canadian society
in exchange for maintaining some form of housing. And some, simply, go homeless.
Vancouver serves as a good example of the range of Canadian urban housing
circumstances at its most extreme. Clearly, Vancouver has a homelessness problem. This is often
discussed; in many neighbourhoods of Vancouver it is hard to miss. The latest Homelessness
Count took place in the spring of 2014 and showed that Vancouver currently has the highest
homeless population since records have been kept. A total of 1,803 people identified as
homeless, with 536 living on the street and 1,267 in shelters.32 More generally in Vancouver, the
incidence of Core Housing Need is 20.1 per cent, the highest in urban Canada.33
Accompanying this situation as it plays out across Canada is a general absence of effective
governmental strategy to reduce homelessness and housing insecurity at the federal and
provincial levels.34 In 2004, two Canadian housing scholars wrote that, “Canada’s housing
system is now the most private-sector, market-based of any Western nation, including the United
States.”35 The Canadian policy profile that shapes this picture from a decade ago certainly has
not changed. Indeed, the path forward has been even more so one of sustained federal
government withdrawal from the business of housing provision.36 In 2006, international human
rights expert members of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights called for Canada to,
implement a national strategy for reduction of homelessness that includes measurable
goals and timetables, consultation and collaboration with affected communities,
complaints procedures, and transparent accountability mechanisms, in keeping with
ICESCR standards.37
Efforts have been made to advance such a national strategy in Parliament, one that
reflects the human rights focus of the Committee’s recommendation. Twice, a private member’s
bill has been introduced into the House of Commons that would obligate the government to
develop a national strategy. And, twice, the private member bill in question has been effectively
vanquished.38 In the current Conservative Party majority controlled Parliament, a third attempt
would be equally futile. The “political willingness and boldness at all levels of government” to
implement a fix to the failed system are nowhere in evidence.39
32

Greater Vancouver Regional Committee on Homelessness (2014), “Results of the 2014 Homeless Count in the
Metro Vancouver Region,” online: <http://vancouver.ca/files/cov/Results-of-the-2014-Metro-Vancouver-HomelessCount-July-31-2014.pdf>.
33
Toronto is 17.9 per cent and Halifax is 14.7 per cent. See Canadian Housing Observer 2013, supra note 26.
34
One province, Alberta, has implemented a strategic plan called “A Plan for Alberta: Ending Homelessness in 10
Years”, online: <http://humanservices.alberta.ca/documents/PlanForAB_Secretariat_final.pdf>. For an overview of
government action and inaction see the affidavit of Michael Shapcott, Director, Wellesley Institute, online:
<http://www.wellesleyinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Afd.-of-MICHAEL-SHAPCOTT-DirectorAffordable-Housing-and-Social-Innovation-Wellesley-Institute-FINAL.pdf>.
35
David Hulchanski & Michael Shapcott, Finding Room: Options for a Canadian Rental Housing Strategy
(Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, 2004) at 6.
36
Gaetz et al, Homelessness, supra note 7.
37
CESCR, Concluding observations, 22 May 2006, E/C.12/CAN/CO/4 - E/C.12/CAN/CO/5, at para 62.
38
The first attempt died on the order paper when a general election was called. The second attempt was defeated at
second reading by the coordinated governmental member vote against it.
39
Strange, supra note 6 at 1.
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Government default cannot be justified by reference to the difficulty of the issue.
Certainly, the affordability gap so many groups encounter does not permit easy resolution. Is
housing too expensive or is income too low?40 Solutions will not be cheap and simple. But,
options abound as to policy choices that could address the housing crisis. For example, changes
to either housing costs or to individual income and purchasing power generate two sets of
different policies, each from different ends of the supply/demand model, aiming at the same
outcome, increased housing affordability. Some argue for supply-based approaches of
construction subsidies and social housing; others for more demand-based policies, such as shelter
subsidies and income transfer programmes.41 A wide range of potential policy solutions beckons.
And, while what is best and at what level of government—federal, provincial, or municipal or
some combination of all three—it should be implemented, are complex and open questions,42
none of this difficulty justifies government inaction or neglect.
This observation about multiple policy options (and the earlier discussion of what
“adequate” might mean in the context of housing) foreshadows my next point: desired housing
outcomes must be appropriately and variously nuanced to the populations most vulnerable to
housing insecurity. The groups experiencing housing inadequacy in Canada are diverse. Housing
insecurity, and the forms it takes, vary. While street homelessness is a visible and stark reminder
of this injustice, other experiences of housing insecurity—crowded shelter, insecurity of tenure,
unhealthy housing, “couch-surfing”—are also concerning, deserving significant policy attention.
Thus, homelessness counts give a picture of part of the problem. They not only undercount the
sheltered and unsheltered homeless, but, by definition, ignore a fuller range of housing
insecurity. And, variety is also reflected by the diversity of groups in Canadian society that
disproportionally face housing and shelter crises. Housing insecurity as Indigenous peoples
experience it on reserve needs specific analysis. Persons with disabilities, similarly, have
particular, unique concerns. Youth, new immigrants, families, lone-parent families add to this list
of socio-economically configured interface with Canada’s housing market and supply. It is clear
that a minimum number of considerations may pertain to what constitutes adequate housing but
these features will be achieved in different ways for different groups of individuals. Indeed, the
list generated by CESCR, as already mentioned, may need expansion in reference to many
groups’ specific socio-economic features. Ensuring effective and adequate housing provision
requires a prismatic approach: “the general picture [must] be fractured into distinct images of
housing as the various marginalized and disadvantaged groups in Canada experience it.”43 The
multiplicity of housing needs and of responses to housing insecurity requires a full, creative, and
coordinated range of policy responses.
Capturing exactly how Canada’s housing crisis is compounded by the diversity of
Canadian society goes beyond the scope of this paper. But, because this observation is critical to
the argument of this paper, I do want to provide one example of how housing policy must be
responsive to particular groups’ needs, experiences, and situations. The illustration I use looks to
gender and how this identity feature configures housing analysis.

40

See the discussion in Strange, supra note 6 at 4.
Strange, supra note 6 at 4.
42
Strange, supra note 6 at 7.
43
Gurstein & Young, supra note 28 at 8.
41
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Without doubt, the disadvantages and harms of inadequate housing are, like much else in
society, gendered.44 How women are affected and how they cope with inadequate housing reflect
the options, limitations, and structures that inflect patriarchy in 21st century Canada. Two
scholars recently wrote: “[h]ousing systems and opportunities are embedded within structured
and institutionalised relations of power which are gendered.”45 These gendered relations of
power shape policy, standardize institutions, and configure social programmes. Thus, in 2009,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing heard evidence from Canadian
groups that: “The lack of adequate and secure housing particularly impacts women who are
disproportionally affected by poverty, homelessness, housing affordability problems, violence
and discrimination in the private rental market.”46 More generally, feminist scholars detail
“concerns about women’s place in the contemporary post-industrial city.”47 The “gendered social
geographies”48 that shape and are shaped by housing options are critically essential to the
effective setting and assessment of housing policy.
Statistics tell this gendered tale about housing. Some examples follow. Sexual abuse and
domestic violence are major causes and consequences of homelessness among women.49 One
study found that one in five homeless women interviewed reported having been sexually
assaulted while on the streets or homeless.50 A recent Toronto study found that 37 per cent of the
homeless women interviewed had been physically assaulted in the prior year and 21 per cent had
been sexually assaulted or raped one or more times in the same time period. Homeless women
were ten times more likely to be sexually assaulted than homeless men, more likely to have
serious physical health problems, and twice as likely to have received a mental health
diagnosis.51 Similarly, in her study of homeless women in Ottawa, Halifax and Vancouver, Neal
found that a significant number had experienced violence while living on the street: “they have
been clubbed, raped, molested, and taken advantage of while seeking protection from harm.”52
Women disproportionately experience discrimination in the rental market, discrimination based
on poverty, receipt of social assistance, race, marital status, and intimate violence.
The affordability gap is a huge motor for housing insecurity. Here, again gender tells.
Men earn more than women; women are disproportionately among the poorest of the poor.
While women’s involvement in the paid labour force steadily rises, making a significant
contribution to Canada’s economic growth, this involvement, nonetheless, is at lower wages than
44

Ingrid Westendop, Women and Housing: Gender Makes A Difference (Cambridge: Intersentia Publishers, 2007).
Kam-Wah Chan & Patricia Kennett, “Introduction: Women and Housing Systems” in Kam-Wah Chan & Patricia
Kennett, eds, Women and Housing: An International Analysis (Oxon: Routledge, 2011) at 1 [Chan & Kennett,
Introduction].
46
Women's Housing Equality Network, Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of Canada, September 2008.
47
Leslie Kern, Sex and the Revitalized City: Gender, Condominium Development, and Urban Citizenship
(Vancouver; University of British Columbia Press, 2010) at 1.
48
Ibid at 5.
49
Rusty Neal, “Voices: Women, Poverty and Homelessness in Canada” (2004) at 31, online: National Anti-Poverty
Organization <http://ywcacanada.ca/data/research_docs/00000275.pdf >.
50
Erika Khandor & Kate Mason, “The Street Health Report 2007” (2007), online: Street Health
<http://www.streethealth.ca/downloads/the-street-health-report-2007.pdf>.
51
The Street Health Report 2007, “Women & Homelessness, Research Bulletin #2” (2007) at 3, 5, online: Street
Health <http://ywcacanada.ca/data/research_docs/00000019.pdf>. See also Emily Paradis et al, Better Off In A
Shelter?: A Year of Homelessness & Housing Among Status Immigrant, Non-Status Migrant, & Canadian-Born
Families (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Urban and Community Studies, 2008).
52
Neal, supra note 49 at 10.
45
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those paid men. Women are, as a recent study looking at employment in Canadian cities notes,
three times as likely to work in part-time jobs, and nearly twice as likely to work for minimum
wages compared to men.53 Sole female parents and elderly women register in higher numbers in
this group.54 Not surprisingly, then, these groups also rank, as already noted, as in high Core
Housing Need.55
Other scholars, more conceptually, point to how women’s gendered position in society
has also meant that women, as disproportionately the “keepers of the hearth,” have “long
understood the meaning of housing beyond provision of shelter—that [housing ] has unique
economic, psychological, and symbolic significance with profound impacts on a family’s wellbeing and quality of life.”56 And, because of women’s social location, the concrete issues of
safety, adequacy, proximity to work/child care, transportation, affordability all reflect social
orders structured by gender and by women’s unique placement ideologically in public and
private orderings of space.
Kam-Wah Chan and Patricia Kennett, the two scholars referred to above, identify three
dominant discourses about gender and housing. Each discourse captures an important element of
the import of gender in this area and, consequently, each deserves a quick review. The first
discourse comes out of the urban planning tradition where feminist planners, concerned how
housing design and the lived environment impact women, have argued since the nineteenth
century that improved housing and urban design could free women from many aspects of their
daily subordination.57 Today, this perspective has matured and now looks more complexly at the
relationships between gender, space, and housing in important ways. Susan Fainstein and Lisa
Servon, theorists cited by Chan and Kennett, look to social transformation in power relations
from within “a planning/social policy context [to] lay the groundwork for the creation of ‘nonsexist’ cities.”58
The “housing welfare discourse,” a second approach, is located by Chan and Kennett as
an offshoot of the “welfare feminism” of the 1970s and the 1980s with its focus on social welfare
as the "mechanism to achieve gender equality.”59 Availability of women-specific housing
resources and increasing housing-related services for women are policy objectives of this strand.
The literature from this perspective thus identifies a number of special housing needs for women.
Representative proponent, Roberta Woods, argued in 1994 about the need for research about
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women in relation to the delivery and management of housing services, ensuring a gender
specific perspective on “housing provision, production and management.”60
The last approach is the one favoured by Chan and Kennett: the social constructionist
discourse. An offspring of neo-Marxism, critical theory and postmodernism, this approach looks
at how gender inequality is constructed (a term deployed both metaphorically and practically) in
the housing system. 61 Critique focuses on gender-blind assumptions central to housing policies,
making the basic theoretical observation that housing is never merely “bricks and mortar.”62
Homeless women or lone parent women, for example, are disadvantaged by and unreflected in
policy as dominant conceptions of the problem remain gender blind at the centre. Marginal
tinkering to add on to mainstream policy or projects some accommodation63 for women’s
“special needs” fails to undo the central gender hegemony of the housing system.64 For an
illustrative argument, Leslie Kern writes that,
[w]omen’s housing needs, whether as heads of households or members of a twoadult household, have been subsumed into what is largely a heteronormative family
policy, wherein women’s housing needs were considered merely a corollary of the
male breadwinner’s needs. Women’s concentration in low-end rental and other types
of alternative tenure was viewed as a transitional phase in women’s housing careers
rather than a genuine social and economic pattern that deserved policy
consideration.65
More generally, and not with gender specificity, housing scholar Jessie Hohmann writes
that: “…the way identity is recognised, socially and legally, is often mediated through
relationships with the house and home, both as a physical, material thing, and as an ideological
construct.”66 Hohmann reinforces this contention at another point of her argument when she
argues that housing policies can be “tools of social reorganization, even social engineering.”67
Hohmann’s book, The Right to Housing: Law, Concepts, Possibilities, has been a useful
reference. The book contains an interesting discussion highlighting how adequate housing
provision for women is complicated by the specific ideological framing of women as
homemakers. She notes that, even when housed, women can be practically homeless. The
household’s association with the nuclear family, and women’s role in that family form, accord
women a version of “privacy…more akin to privation than refuge.”68 Linked then to this
observation are the reams of feminist research showing how our legal and social systems’
traditional understandings of the home as sanctuary, definitionally shielded from public scrutiny,
have contributed to significant violence and deprivation for women within the home. Hohmann’s
discussion thus illustrates just how complexly and profoundly gendered are our dominant notions
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of housing arrangements. This type of social constructionist argument casts critical light on
traditional notions of adequacy. It also, Hohmann would argue, makes the case for framing
women’s housing issues in terms of a right to adequate housing: the individualistic frame of that
entitlement claim pulls women’s needs out from within the private reaches of the “family,” thus,
she argues, challenging the traditional and “cellular form” of society.69 We can, through such a
political claim, “interrogate” the linkage of “woman” and “home” and thus radically recast
women’s housing concerns from private demands to public obligations.70 This is, she argues, part
of a strategy for equal social citizenship for women.
Interestingly, this conversation has elements consonant with the notion of substantive
equality, as that notion has been developed by feminist legal scholars in Canada.71 The housing
analysis advocated here is sensitive to how difference and diversity are manifested and how each
are or are not reflected and engrained in social policy and law. This conceptualization allows for
greater diversity than gender alone can signify, recognizing that women are also identified by
race, ability, culture, and class, for example. Chan and Kennett thus argue that the social
constructionist approach can be sensitive not merely to cultural meaning but also to material
deprivation and outcome: “housing design, access to housing resources, and housing ideology
are all part and parcel of the social construction process.”72 Urban theorist Leslie Kern in a
marvelous book on marketing condominiums to women writes in a similar vein about neo-liberal
urbanism’s reinscription through a city’s built spaces of “particular identities and subject
positions.”73 Like Hohmann, Kern sees the ways in which housing provision, and the ideological
assumptions underlying it, shape in particular ways women’s opportunities for equal inclusion,
or gendered exclusion, in the city.
The discussion about gender, and how it matters in relation to housing provision and
policy, shows us that housing provision necessarily engages rights of gender equality as captured
by both section 7 and section 15 of the Charter. One author, to this end, writes that “two decades
of quantitative and qualitative research into women’s position in the housing market have
produced a picture of entrenched, systemic disadvantage.”74 And, we know that the specific
vulnerabilities attached to being female in our society are amplified, exacerbated, and made more
intransigent by the lack of adequate housing documented across the country. It also means that
any remedial response to this problem must be sensitively and variously configured to take into
account such evidence of intersectionality and diversity in vulnerability and need. Any plan or
solution to women’s housing insecurity must take into account the particularities of women’s
experiences across a wide range of diverse circumstances
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The simple conclusion for wider policy? Housing insecurity at large—its causes,
manifestations, and potential solutions—is a necessarily “pixelated” picture. A general concern
about and broad characterization of the housing issue are possible but these must rest on and
devolve actively into recognition of complexity and diversity. No simple, single policy solution
is desirable, or possible. Housing provision has long been cited as a “wicked problem.”75
Solutions to the problem at large are necessarily multi-faceted and require nuanced calibration
across a number of economic, social, and cultural fronts. Addressing housing concerns for one
demographic may ignore, complicate, even frustrate, solutions required for other groups. And
judicial orders, unless nuanced to this reality and reflective of a moving, shifting picture, rather
than simple snapshots, will not fix the problems. Absent this sort of fractured, multiple, and
inclusive lens, one risks the “decontextualized and abstract interpretations of the right [to
housing] that currently exist in the majority of legal interpretations of the right.”76 Or, as
Hohmann puts it, housing provision too simply understood might provide a “floor…but [also] a
ceiling” to equality and inclusive social citizenship.77 This conclusion to the first half of the
paper takes us nicely to consideration of the Tanudjaja case.

III. TANUDJAJA V ATTORNEY GENERAL (CANADA)
The first parts of this paper have touched on key points of the context out of which the
constitutional challenge of the Tanudjaja case arose. More specifically, the argument has been
made that housing policy that effectively addresses Canada’s housing crisis will necessarily be
complex and complicated, orchestrated with different groups in mind, and involving a range of
programmes, fiscal measures, and levels of governments. With this initial discussion in mind, I
move now to discuss briefly the challenge the Tanudjaja applicants brought and the bases on
which the preliminary motions to dismiss the challenge were successful at the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice and, subsequently, at the Ontario Court of Appeal. This conversation sets up my
final contention that the trial judgement, if left standing, leaves very little space for our most
serious, and thus large and complex, social justice failures to have adequate constitutional
register. My goal is not to canvas and critique fully the trial court judgment. Rather, the slice
offered is one that focuses on the key dangers of the trial judgment, and the Court of Appeal’s
support of that judgment’s conclusion on justiciability, to progressive Charter development in
the area of social justice and rights.
The Tanudjaja case was brought by four individual applicants, all of whom are in
circumstances of significant housing insecurity. Their experiences reflect the range of groups
most vulnerable to housing inadequacy: sole female parents, the disabled, low-income families,
and the very poor.78 These individuals were joined in the application by an Ontario based non-
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profit housing advocacy organization, the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation.79
Several groups successfully sought intervener status for the hearing of the preliminary motion
(and, subsequently, for the appeal to the Court of Appeal).80 All argued in favour of the case
proceeding and such extensive intervener activity at this preliminary stage signals the importance
social justice rights groups across Canada have assigned the challenge.
The initiating application was issued 26 May 2010. The claim can be simply summarized:
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms81 must be read to impose an obligation on the
governments of Canada and Ontario each to have in place policies and strategies ensuring
affordable, adequate, and accessible housing for all.82 Yet, the Applicants stated, the
governments have created and sustained conditions that lead to, support, and sustain
homelessness and inadequate housing. As such, these governments are in breach of section 7 and
section 15 of the Charter.
Three important and interconnected components make up the rights claims. First, the
Applicants argue that the governments have instituted changes to existing legislation, policies,
programs, and services that have resulted in homelessness and inadequate housing. Second, it is
claimed that new policies were implemented without adequate and constitutionally required
efforts to address impacts on housing access and on vulnerable group’s access, in particular, to
adequate housing. Consequent negative effects on homelessness and housing insecurity have
gone unaddressed or unameliorated. Third, and finally, the argument maintains that neither
government has undertaken appropriate strategic coordination to ensure that government
programmes protect the homeless or those most at risk of homelessness.83 This mix of action and
inaction imperils life, liberty, and security of the person for those without adequate housing in a
fundamentally unjust manner, and, as well, infringes the right to substantive equality for these
same individuals. The individual applicants’ various circumstance and histories illustrate these
negative, rights-infringing outcomes.
The remedial order requested reflects the tripartite nature of the constitutional wrongs
claimed and itself has three distinct elements. First, and most direct, was the request that the
court issue a series of declarations detailing how the governments are in breach of their
constitutional obligations under sections 7 and 15, including by creating conditions of housing
insecurity and failing to implement effective strategies aimed at reducing and eliminating
housing insecurity. Second, the Applicants sought judicial orders that housing strategies be
developed and implemented according to a range of conditions and policy parameters. These
considerations involve such things as consultation with affected groups and various
accountability measures84 key to effective rights implementation. Third, the Applicants asked
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that the court retain supervisory jurisdiction, that is, the court administer the judicial orders and
oversee government compliance in light of declared constitutional obligations.85
The response of the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario was to bring motions to
dismiss the application. Both governments argued that, among other things, it was “plain and
obvious” that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed and the issues raised were not
justiciable. On the basis of the motions, the court dismissed the application.86
Justice Lederer wrote the decision on the preliminary motions, employing a number of
recurring themes determinative of the dismissal: breadth of considerations relevant to the policies
and strategies challenged by the Applicants; no precedent for rights to housing; radical change
requested in Charter law; imposition on the public purse; and institutional boundaries. Two
themes stand out: no protection for positive rights and the non-justiciability of the challenge. The
motion judge’s handling of each shows a failure to appreciate the nature of rights—conceptually
and jurisprudentially.87 The judgment also ignores the wise caution that the approach to Charter
rights must be a large and liberal one; it is presumptively problematic to foreclose discussion at a
preliminary stage.88 There is, by the way, some irony to this judgment. Dismissal requires that it
is “plain and obvious” that there is no cause of action. The judgment is 56 pages long: a lengthy
argument on the merits to show there is no argument on the merits.

IV. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE RIGHTS
Lederer J’s judgment engages considerably with case law in reference to both section 7 and
section 15. But, common across these two discussions is the insistence that under neither right
are positive government obligations located: “No positive obligation has, in general, been
recognized as having been imposed by the Charter requiring the state to act to protect the rights
it provides for.”89 That is, to paraphrase the Judge, to the extent that the Applicants are citing
government failure to act as a Charter infringement, their arguments must be unsuccessful.
The distinction between positive and negative rights has been written about extensively
and is a common referent in Canadian and American case law. Academic commentary notes that
the distinction captures no clear division with respect to rights characterization.90 Most rights,
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even some of the most classical civil and political rights long enforced by our courts, require a
mix of government forbearance and government action. The right to vote, say, requires not
merely the absence of barriers to voting but proactive (and costly) establishment of electoral
infrastructure—setting up electoral commissions, polling stations, hiring electoral officials, and
so on. All of these have considerable impact on government resources, involving complex
government programmes and legislation. So, while some analytical usefulness attaches to
thinking about what type of government responses a particular right requires, it is a mistake to
fail to acknowledge that most rights require a bundle of both government withdrawal and
government provision. Thus, Louis Arbour, when United Nations High Commissioner of Human
Rights, urged moving away from such “simplistic or categorical distinctions.”91
Too many Canadian judges (but not all92) miss this point. Those who give too much
credence to the distinction, using it to provide a rigid typology of rights that can or cannot be
subject to judicial enforcement, miss important insights about rights protections. They “short
sheet” Charter claimants without any sound analytic basis. This is because they fail to realize
that so many rights that are standard fare for judicial enforcement are no less political or
“positive” than those socio-economic rights currently under dispute. The older, more classic,
rights have simply, through the accretion of tradition, been lifted above “the fray of
contestation.”93
Most critically for the applicants’ case and for this comment, Lederer J’s use of the
distinction between positive and negative rights sets up an understanding of Charter rights
protection that ensures little constitutional space for social justice struggles. Policy solutions for
resolution of Canada’s housing emergency widely require government programmes and
spending. No housing advocates call for more government pull-out in the area of housing
provision. Absent judicial willingness to recognize positive Charter obligations, our Charter will
be mostly mute on the injustices of widespread homelessness and inadequate housing.

V. JUSTICIABILITY
Justiciability issues focus on the institutional appropriateness of a claim for judicial review. With
the advent of the Charter, and its increasing invocation by social activists frustrated by political
blind alleys, the issue of justiciability has also been the focus of much judicial and academic
commentary.94 Lederer J raises his concerns about this issue in relation both to the substantive
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rights claims about section 7 and section 15 and to the character of remedy requested. His
conclusion, in both regards, is that,
… the application is misconceived. There is an inherent tension between, [sic] the
“institutional boundaries” that, on one hand, define the authority of the Legislature
and, on the other hand, determine the responsibility of the courts to protect the
substantive entitlements the Charter provides… .95
The argument appears to have two components. First, Lederer J states that the Charter
does not empower courts to “decide upon the appropriateness of policies underlying legislative
enactments.”96 What he means, exactly, by this is not clear. But Lederer J would have done well
to attend to what the Supreme Court wrote in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS Community
Services Society:
Finally, the issue of illegal drug use and addiction is a complex one which attracts a
variety of social, political, scientific and moral reactions. While it is for the relevant
governments to make criminal and health policy, when a policy is translated into law
or state action, those laws and actions are subject to scrutiny under the Charter. The
issue is not whether harm reduction or abstinence-based programmes are the best
approach to resolving illegal drug use, but whether Canada has limited the rights of
the claimants in a manner that does not comply with the Charter.97
Policy decisions are not immune from Charter review. True, PHS had concrete state
action at issue—the statute and the Minister’s refusal of exemption—but as the Court said in that
case the question is the impact on claimant rights by the government. The concern in either case
is not about challenging policy per se, in the abstract.
The second element of Lederer J’s argument is about the breadth and number of policies
at issue under section 7 and section 15 and over which remedial supervision is requested. Lederer
J seems confounded by the fact that no single government programme or law fronts the
challenge. He concludes that the challenge points to so many programmes that what the
Applicants require is, baldly, “consideration of how our society distributes and redistributes
wealth.”98 This is, he continues, an important set of questions “but the courtroom is not the place
for their review.”99
One might think that concerns about judicial activism and inappropriate judicial
meddling with legislative prerogatives would be assuaged somewhat by the open ended and
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indeterminate nature of the order requested. No specific concrete measures are requested, simply
that the two governments put their institutional minds to the development and adoption of some
strategy to reduce and eliminate housing insecurity, in a framework that prioritizes the needs of
vulnerable groups. But the motions judge rejects an understanding of the remedial request as
retaining significant government discretion, instead the remedial request is castigated as “the
offering up of a Trojan horse.”100
Lederer J is correct in the first assertion—rights are ultimately about wealth distribution.
Rights are costly and require trade-offs.101 But, the decision to incur such costs was made with
the Charter’s enactment, and the task of ensuring that these costs are engaged assigned to the
judiciary. Two American academics make this point: “In practice, judges defer much less in
fiscal matters than they appear to, simply because the rights that judges help protect have
costs.”102 Moreover, complexity and gravity cannot be reasons for Charter immunity. Challenges
that, like the Trojan horse (or a can of worms), are “packed” reflect the unavoidable complexity
of the modern state. Breadth of problem here signifies depth of problem. And problems that
significantly engage serious and numerous aspects of governance should not, thereby, be
presumptively free of Charter oversight. That would be perverse. Lederer J is perceptive about
the importance of housing rights and the scope of government action needed—he simply runs in
the wrong direction with these observations. These points ought to make Charter applicability all
the more compelling, not frightening.
General concerns about justiciability continue to stalk Charter litigation.103 Other
jurisdictions too grapple with the question.104 The British scholar Hohmann notes: “Courts have
made determination on the right to housing without bringing the economics of states to their
knees or marginalising the elected branch of government to the point of pointlessness …
practical concerns can be overcome.”105 Hohmann also notes quite rightly that the two
arguments—negative versus positive rights and justiciability—are importantly connected.
Recognition of the inevitable costs of even negative rights takes that sting away from so-called
positive rights and from much of the justiciability concern: “the suggestion that the right to
housing is uniquely problematic fades away.”
Two other jurisdictions have enshrined “high profile”106 rights to housing, albeit through
somewhat different pathways, in their respective constitutional law. This paper does not allow
the opportunity to explore this in detail. But, it bears noting that both South Africa and India
have seen considerable political struggle around adequate housing provision “leveraged” through
constitutional litigation. While neither provides a resounding triumph for housing claims, both
examples show that there is space in constitutionalism for a rights based argument about housing
insecurity. This (too) brief mention is included to point out, more substantively, that denial of
constitutional recognition of a right to housing ought not to be the foregone conclusion the
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motions judge appeared to assume. At least, that ought not to be a conclusion reached, at this
stage of Canadian jurisprudence, in a preliminary motion to dismiss
Nonetheless, the motion judge’s arguments withstood review at the Court of Appeal. Two
of the three justices hearing the appeal, Pardu and Strathy JJA, upheld the decision of the
motions judge to dismiss the action. The third Justice, Feldman JA, would have allowed the
appeal, returning the application to the lower court for adjudication on the merits.
The reasons for the majority dismissal of the appeal focus on the question of
justiciability. Pardu JA is author of these reasons and summarized this concern as involving: “a
normative inquiry into the appropriateness as a matter of constitutional judicial policy of the
courts deciding a given issue, or instead deferring to other decision making institutions of the
polity.”107 That is, more simply put, the concern circles on whether or not this is a question
purely of the political realm or one with sufficient legal aspect to engage judicial contemplation.
Thus, at stake for these justices is the distinction between legal and political questions and the
relevance of that distinction to determination of judicial institutional capacity.108 Sufficient legal
content is required for adequate judicial competency over the question.109 The majority’s
conclusion is that there is insufficient legal content to this claim to engage a court’s decision
making capacity.
The majority reaches this outcome by re-framing the application as, in essence, the
assertion “that Canada and Ontario have given insufficient priority to issues of homelessness and
inadequate housing.”110 This reduces the claim to a more simple and purely policy challenge, one
that, to paraphrase the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v PHS
Community Services Society, focuses on government policy that has not been translated into law
or state action.111 So understood, the challenge appears to ask the Court to engage in the kind of
policy assessment and divination best left to the legislative branch. The sticking point for the
majority at the Court of Appeal is that no specific law or government action is singled out by the
challenge. A specific focus on one law is, the majority argues, “an archetypal feature of Charter
challenges under section 7 and section 15.”112 Here, there is no such focus and the claim is
dismissible, it is thus argued, on the grounds of non-justiciability.113
Two aspects of the majority argument bear critical examination. First, the recasting of the
challenge as simply to policy alone is incorrect. The challenge is not to policy, hovering in some
realm separate from government action and from practical effect (if that were possible). The
pleadings establish that the applicants’ claim is much more complex and faceted. Targeted, as
already noted, is a broad range of government actions and inactions—all of which, the applicants
claim, have significant rights-destructive effects in Canadian society. Second, justiciability as the
majority understands and deploys the notion, connects to two issues the majority (incorrectly)
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states it is leaving alone: the issues of positive versus negative obligations and of novel claim
making under the Constitution. It is from the perspectives of these two issues that the dissenting
judgment sets up its opposition to the majority opinion.
To repeat the first issue connected to the finding of non-justiciability, the key concern of
the majority is really the question of whether both state action and inaction are subject to Charter
scrutiny. The argument that policy, absent translation into government action, is immune from
Charter standards relies upon the idea that unless the government positively acts, a policy
decision to not act is untouchable. A claim asserting a general right to housing under section 7,
is, thus, the majority asserts, a “doubtful proposition.”114 Yet, this contention about what is or
isn't protected under the Charter is not certain law, as the majority choice of language itself
indicates. At the stage of preliminary review on a motion to dismiss, best guesses as to legal
outcomes as yet undecided are unsound reasons for dismissal. Such a question of constitutional
rights interpretation, given that it is an open question to date, must be allowed to go to argument
on the merits. To collapse it into a finding of non-justiciability is faulty elision of issues.115
The majority compounds this error in its additional reasoning about section 1 and
remedial possibilities. There must also be, the Court asserts, an impugned law whose objective
can be evaluated under the Oakes test of section 1 application.116 Such an opinion would
condemn any and all sections of the Charter to assertion of negative obligations only. The
argument is based on too literal a reading of the Oakes test117—the requirement that the features
of a “law” be assessed.
Finally, the majority takes issue with the character of the remedial request, arguing that
there is no judicially discoverable and manageable standard for assessment of the adequacy of
any resulting housing strategy in relation to the conditions the remedial request seeks to impose
(adequacy and priority to the most needy).118 But remedial selection can be varied and crafted to
suit concerns of institutional competency and appropriateness independently of the terms of the
claim on the merits. Justiciability concerns about requested remedy inappropriately determine
justiciability on the substantive arguments about rights protection. Remedial requests have no
place in the determination of whether or not the challenge can proceed to consideration on its
merits. Should an infringement be found, then fuller engagement with the range of jurisprudence
showcased, for example, in the intervenor factum of the Asper Centre on remedy, can then be
better canvased.119
The minority judgment, crafted by Feldman JA, would find that it was an error of law to
strike this claim at the pleadings stage. Feldman JA’s judgment begins with the reminder that the
test for striking the application at this stage is whether it is “plain and obvious” that the claim is
doomed.120 This requires that, as the Supreme Court of Canada notes, the claim is “certain to
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fail.”121 Significantly, the Supreme Court has stated that neither length and complexity of the
issue nor novelty alone is reason to strike a claim. Instead, the Supreme Court, through the pen of
the Chief Justice, has cautioned that the decision to strike must be carefully deployed: new and
novel (and lauded) developments in the law are standard and many result from actions initially
deemed hopeless and initially challenged by preliminary motions to strike.122 Consequently,
“[t]he approach must be generous and err on the side of permitting a novel but arguable claim to
proceed to trial.”123 The dissent by Feldman JA emphasizes these refinements of the test for
dismissal, issuing the stricture that “[t]he motion to strike should not be used … as a tool to
frustrate potential developments in the law.”124
The motions judge comes in for specific criticism in relation to this larger concern.
Discussion of the applicants’ section 7 claim was flawed in four specific ways: misstatement of
the appellants’ claim; misstatement of section 7 jurisprudence; definition of section 7
jurisprudence inappropriate to decision-making in a motion to strike; and, preventing
consideration of the full evidentiary record.125 Each of these charges is discussed at some length,
with Feldman JA detailing, in particular, the motion judge’s extensive doctrinal interpretations
and resolutions of law not yet settled that ill-fit the context of a preliminary motion to dismiss.
Most damning, however, for Feldman JA is the result that the motion judge would leave the 16
volumes of evidentiary record submitted by the appellants unexaminable, particularly to the
question of whether or not special circumstances exist for inclusion of positive obligations under
section 7.126 Equally, Feldman JA notes that the motions judge engaged in fact finding, doctrinal
exegesis and resolution in his discussion of the applicants’ section 15 claim. In the absence of
engagement with the full evidentiary record and in the context of a preliminary motion the
motions judge’s conclusions about causal factors and analogous grounds are faulty. Such matters
are “not open for decision when the application is not allowed to proceed.”127
In her discussion of the justiciability concern, Feldman JA takes on her own Court of
Appeal colleagues more directly. Citing a number of academic authorities, she argues that: “to
strike a serious Charter application at the pleadings stage on the basis of justiciability is
therefore inappropriate.”128 More specifically, while the novel form of the claim raises some
tricky procedural and conceptual difficulties for both the Charter argument and remedial stage,
again Feldman JA reminds her colleagues that novelty alone is not a relevant reason for
dismissal and that, as helpfully underlined by one of the intervenors, the question of remedy is
distinct and subject to judicial crafting independent of argument pertaining to Charter breach.129
Feldman JA concludes by reminding her audience that this application represents not
only the claims of a broad range of disadvantaged individuals and groups, but is backed by a
considerable number of credible intervening institutions with much expertise in Charter
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jurisprudence and analysis. This larger frame adds weight to her opinion that the “housekeeping”
measure of dismissal for lack of reasonable cause is improperly wielded by the motions judge.
So, why is such common and convincing conceptual parsing beyond the ken of many of
our judges? Clearly, something more ideological is at play. Resort to stale platitudes about
positive versus negative rights and “misconceived” challenges may signal an underlying general
anxiety about the redistribution of resources, recognition, and participation130 activists push
through Charter litigation. More evocatively, these challenges threaten the “mythology of … the
majestic, enduring and self-sustaining neutrality”131 of constitutional law. Articulation of
rights—of any sort—involves delineation of an imaginary line between public and private
regulation and, thus, “to ask the purpose of human rights is always to ask a political question.”132
The libratory potential of rights is the unavoidable flip side of coercive potential, that is, of
rights’ power to impose the public values they enshrine on private and personal orderings. The
right to housing engages specially with this classical tension between liberty and equality as the
right to housing so centrally encompasses that most private sphere—the home.133 Combatting
this political reluctance, and its ideological roots, is beyond the reach of doctrinal correction and
critique. But it is appropriately targeted by the charge that judges who assert its mythology
unquestioningly must be held responsible for ensuring that social justice under the Charter will
never amount to much.
It is not surprising that the Attorneys General have pushed motions to dismiss. It is a
strategic move given the character of the Canadian judiciary. But it is a strategy that will work to
consign Canada’s constitutional protection of human rights well behind the leaders of global
human rights protection. The argument this paper seeks to advance is that the character of human
rights infringements like denial of access to adequate housing does not fit the tidy boxes of
traditionally framed legal challenges. This observation flows significantly in part from the early
indication of just how complex housing needs across various groups are. If we want to be able to
scrutinize the multiple and textured way in which the state is implicated in setting the conditions
necessary for this crisis, and for the maintenance and intensification of the crisis, it is important
to have within the purview of the court more than singular “snippets” of government action and
inaction. Equally, orders that compel governments to coordinate across a range of programmes
and actions may be the answer to providing reasonable remedial response to human rights crises
of this fractured sort. This is the question the Tanudjaja case has handed the courts. It would be a
shame if these arguments never get their day in court.

VI. CONCLUSION
So, the Tanudjaja application has foundered on the two traditional bogeymen repeatedly thrown
up to block socio-economic rights: fears about positive rights and the spectre of non130
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justiciability. That these hurdles would appear so powerfully in this application is not
surprising—the applicants’ challenge is an extensive condemnation of current, regular
government practice. It is a parry against “business as usual.” The claim makes visible and gives
voice to the many among us whose basic needs go unmet, while calling the government to
account for this dispossession. This is disruptive—as rights at their best are.134 Private suffering
is rendered public and collective response becomes obligatory.135
Consequently, the repeated defeat of this application at the stage of a preliminary motion
to dismiss is distressing. Tanudjaja raises such important issues. Governments duck and weave
when confronted politically with the sight, and plight, of the poorly housed. The most so far that
insistence on negative obligations under the Constitution has achieved are the temporary
cardboard box overhead shelters of Victoria (City) v Adams.136 If litigation under the Charter is
not allowed to present more than narrow pieces of the problem of housing insecurity at any one
time, if all the Charter can do is stay silent in the face of government inaction, and if courts
continue to dodge acknowledgement that rights are always already about redistribution, then the
homeless and other marginalized groups in Canadian society are truly constitutionally outside in
the cold.
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